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A deal has been written during the past several years about the 
increasing number of professional liability actions that are being brought 
against attorneys by their former clients. Indeed, some commentators have 
taken the position that a legal malpraCtice "crisis", similar to the medical 
malpractice crisis that has so adversely affected physicians in recent years, is 
imminent for the bar. This short note will turn away from the factual 
question concerning the existence of such a crisis and look instead at the 
legal issues that form the basis of an attorney's professional liability 
exposure in Virginia. 
A Virginia First 
Beginning with the historical background, one discovers that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia has the rather dubious distinction of being the 
battleground where the first legal malpractice action in America was fought 
at the appellate level. 1 The negligence complained of in this case was the 
attorney's failure to file a necessary pleading which, in turn, caused a 
judgment previously recovered by the plaintiff to be reversed. The attorney 
In question def ended on the merits and also on the ground that, since he did 
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APRIL 1977 19 
not receive any compensation for his services, he should not be liable for any 
loss that the plaintiff might have suffered, even though such loss might be 
attributable to a lack of due care on his part. 
In deciding this case of first impression in this country, the Court of 
Appeals stated that "it is undoubtedly true that an attorney is liable for 
neglect of duty and that he is bound to make retribution to his client for the 
injury which he may thereby sustain."2 And, in responding to the defense 
based on lack of consideration, the Court stated that "though a man is not 
bound to do an act for another without a reward, yet if he will voluntarily 
engage, and enter upon the performance of it, he is liable for the 
consequences of his improper management."3 
Definition Added 
This statement of an attorney's liability to his client has since been 
codified by the General Assembly and now appears in the Code of Virginia 
as follows: "Every attorney at law shall be liable to his client for any damage 
sustained by him by the neglect of his duty as such attorney."4 This basic 
statement of the rule has received added definition over the years as 
appellate cases involving the attorney malpractice issue have been decided, 
and the present general rule has been stated by the Virginia Supreme Court 
as follows: 
The law implies a promise on the part of attorneys that they will execute 
the business intrusted to their professional management, with a 
reasonable degree of care, skill, and dispatch, and they are liable to an 
action if guilty of a default in either of these duties whereby their clients 
are injured, and this liability of the attorney is not affected by the 
client's diligence or the want of it, unless stipulated for by special 
contract. While there can be no doubt that for any misfeasance or 
unreasonable neglect of an attorney whereby his client suffers a loss an 
action may be supported and damages recovered to the amount of the 
loss, yet it is equally well established that an attorney in !he 
management of his professional business is not bound to an 
extraordinary diligence, but only to use a reasonable degree of care and 
skill, reference being had to the character of the business he undertakes 
to do, and is not to be answerable for every error or mistake, but, on the 
contrary, will be protected if he acts in good faith, to the best of his skill 
and knowledge, and with an ordinary degree of attention.5 
Tort vs. Contract 
While the rule of attorney liability has long been established in Virginia, it 
has been unknown during most of this time whether the Virginia was 
based on a tort theory or on a contract theory. Under the contract theory it is 
said that when a lawyer agrees to perform a service for a client, he makes an 
implied promise to use reasonable skill and diligence. If he fails to do so, 
then he has breached the contract and is liable in an action thereon. Under 
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the tort theory it is said that when an attorney and his client enter into the 
attorney-client relationship, the law imposes a duty on the attorney to use 
due care in the handling of the client's case. If the attorney fails to exercise 
due care, then he is guilty of negligence and is liable in a tort action. 
On the surface it might appear to not make any difference which theory a 
jurisdiction might adopt because the end result is the same in both cases. 
This appearance is illusory, however, because there are three major 
differences between the two theories: (I) it is possible to recover punitive 
damages in appropriate tort cases; (2) the statute of limitations is shorter in 
tort cases; and (3) lack of privity is typically no defense in a tort case. 
This issue of tort theory vs. contract theory was finally brought before the 
Court in Oleyar v. Kerr, Trustee, 6 a case wherein the plaintiff had verbally 
retained the defendant to make a title examination of certain real property. 
The defendant attorney conceded that he was negligent in not discovering a 
particular judgment lien and defended on the ground that the one year 
statute of limitations applicable to non-surviving torts was applicable and 
that it had expired. After surveying the cases from other jurisdictions, the 
Supreme Court decided to "adopt the better reasoned view which is found in 
those cases which hold that an action for the negligence of an attorney in the 
performance of professional services, w~ile sounding in tort, is an action for 
breach of contract and thus governed by the statute of limitations applicable 
to contracts. "7 
Statute of Umitations 
Although the Oleyar case settled that the contract theory would obtain in 
Virginia, it nevertheless left several questions still unresolved. First of all, it 
is unclear from a reading of this case whether the statute of limitations will 
be years if there is a written contract of employment and ten years if the 
written contract of employment is made a covenant by the placing of a 
"(SEAL)" thereon, or whether the applicable period will be three years in all 
cases because the liability is based on an implied term in the contract of 
employment. Accordingly, in recognition of the possibility that the longer 
statutes may be held to apply when such a case comes before the Court, 
prudence would seem to suggest a leaving off of the "(SEAL)" which serves 
no worthwhile purpose in the average case and which might later be held to 
keep the attorney liable for double the period of an ordinary written 
contract of employment. 
one has determined what statute of limitations is applicable to his 
case, the second question is "When does this period of time start to run?" 
This question was before the Court in McCormick v. Romans and Gunn,s 
where the client verbally retained an attorney to handle the sale of a portion 
of real estate in April of 1963. After repeated attempts to obtain an 
accounting from the attorney, the client filed suit in November of 1967, 
which was more than three years after the oral contract was entered into 
with the attorney. In concluding that a defense based on the running of the 
statute of limitations was not sufficient, the Supreme Court stated that 
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"where there is an undertaking which requires a continuation of services, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the termination of the 
undertaking. This special rule is applicable to a continuing agreement 
between attorney and client.. Indeed it is particularly appropriate to an 
attorney-client agreement in view of the trust and confidence inherent in 
that relationship."9 The Court was of the further opinion that the agreement 
in question was not terminated until "the misappropriations by (the 
attorney) were discovered and demand was made in October, 1967, for 
payment of the balance claimed to be due." 1° Consequently, the three year 
period did not begin to run until that time. 
a Factor 
The holding of the McCormick case has grave implications for a number 
of Virginia attorneys whose relationships with one or more clients may be 
said to be of a continuing nature. Take, for example, the common practice 
of some attorneys in serving as custodian of their clients' wills or other legal 
documents after all of the legal work thereon has been finished, the fee paid, 
and the file placed among the inactive or dead files. Will the retention of the 
will or other document, which is done merely as a convenience to the client, 
prevent the statute oflimitations from beginning to run on any error in such 
documents until such time as the documents are delivered to the client or the 
negligence is discovered, whichever comes first? One can be sure that this 
argument will be advanced against the attorney/ custodian and, thus, 
prudence might suggest that (1) attorneys no longer serve as a custodian of 
their clients' wills or other documents, and (2) that when a particular 
representation for a client comes to an end, a termination letter to that effect 
be sent to the client even though the attorney is continuing to represent the 
same client on other matters. 
Even though an attorney should take all of the appropriate steps to 
eliminate the possibility of the continuing relationship argument being 
raised against him, he must still respond to the question "When does the 
statutory period begin to run?" At this time there is no clearly defined 
Virginia rule. The older American cases rather consistently held the 
statute of limitations should start running from the time the attorney 
actually made the negligent mistake. 
However, many of the more recent American cases have held that, since it 
is impossible to expect a client to be able to bring an action at law prior to 
becoming aware of the existence of the negligent mistake, the statute of 
limitations cannot begin to run until the wrong is, or, in the exercise of due 
diligence, should be discovered. While this issue has not yet been before the 
Virginia Supreme Court in the context of a legal malpractice case, the Court 
did reject the discovery rule in the case of Hawks v. De Hart, 11 which 
involved medical malpractice. It has been suggested, however, that the 
Hawks case is not only out of step with the developing law in Virginia's 
neighboring states but that it is also capable of being distinguished on its 
facts. 12 
Retain Coverage 
Accordingly, when a case involving legal malpractice comes before the 
Court it is possible that the discovery rule might then be adopted. Since it is 
thus possible that the Virginia attorney may truly have what some 
commentators refer to as "liability for life," prudence might suggest than an 
attorney give consideration to retaining his professional liability insurance 
coverage after he retires, goes on the bench, or leaves practice for any other 
reason. 
Now that the length of the attorney's malpractive exposure has been 
surveyed, it is time to consider the breadth of this exposure and ask, "Who 
may bring a malpractice action against an attorney?" 
Briefly stated, the doctrine of privity of contract limits those pers.ons who 
can sue for breach of a contract to those persons who are parties (or have 
privity with parties) to the contract. For instance, if A and C should enter 
into a contract which A should breach, it is clear that B cannot bring an 
action at law against A to recover for A's wrongful conduct because Bis not 
in privity with A. And this makes rather obvious sense. 
Suppose, however, that the contract in question is one between Attorney 
and Client to draft a will leaving Client's entire estate to Beneficiary. If 
Attorney breaches the contract by negligently causing the will to be 
defectively executed so that Client dies intestate and Beneficiary takes 
nothing, should B now be able to bring an action at law against A? There is 
still no privity of contract and, under the historic common law rule, the 
answer is no - B still cannot sue. However, a new trend began in California, 
in 1961, in the case of Lucas v. Hamm 13 which several commentators have 
analogized in importance to the famous case of McPherson v. Buick Motor 
Co. 14 The jurisdictions following this trend take the position that under the 
above circumstances it is more just to extend the professional liability of the 
attorney to foreseeable third parties than to impose the loss occasioned by 
the attorney's negligence on the innocent beneficiary, and, consequently, 
they have abrogated the attorney's defense which was based on lack of 
privity of contract. 
The Privity Question 
Turning to the Virginia law concerning privity of contract, one notes that 
Sectwn 54-46 Va. Code Ann. (Repl. vol. 1974) reads "Every attorney at law 
be hable to his client ... (emphasis added). If this emphasized language is 
taken literally, it could be argued that it amounts to a codification of the 
common law doctrine requiring privity of contract on the part of those who 
would seek to hold an attorney liable for his negligence. It is not at all clear 
that this language was intended to be so interpreted or that the Supreme 
Court would be inclined to accept such an interpretation today. In fact, 
there are several policy indicators which suggest that the Court would not 
a~cept such a restrictive interpretation of this code section. First of all, 
yirginia abolished the privity rule in all cases involving products liahility,1s 
Ill 1962, in response to public policy arguments similar to those now being 
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advanced in the legal cases. 
Furthermore, Virgima also recognizes the doctrine of third party 
beneficiary contracts 16-which permits one who is not a party to a contract 
to enforce the contract if it was made for his benefit, in whole or in part 
(emphasis added), even though the third party is not mentioned anywhere in 
the contract. Refering back to the hypothetical case posed above, it would 
seem rather clear that B was an intended beneficiary of C's contract with A. 
And, although a will case has been chosen to illustrate the potential scope of 
an attorney's third party liability, it should be noted that this development is 
not confined to the estate planning area but is spreading throughout many 
other areas of the law as well.17 
It would seem, then, that the climate of public policy in Virginia is quite 
favorable to the reception of this new trend towards the elimination of the 
privity defense in actions to recover for legal malpractice. Accordingly, it is 
concluded that the Virginia attorney not only has a potential "liability for 
life" but that he also may have as broad an exposure to third party liability 
as do the attorneys in any other jurisdiction. 18 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (2 Wash) 203 (1796). 
2 Id., p. 211. The requirement of an actual "injury" was emphasized in Virginia's most recent 
legal malpractice case, Allied Productions, Inc. v. Duesterdick, decided March 4, 1977, 
wherein the Supreme Court held that "when a client has suffered a judgment for money 
damages as the proximate result of his lawyer's negligence such judgment constitutes 
actual damages recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice only to the extent such judgment 
has been paid." Accordingly, a motion for judgment that failed to allege payment of such 
judgment failed to state a cause of action. 
3 Id., pp. 211-212. 
4 Section 54-46 Va. Code Ann. (Rep!. Vol. 1974). This section has further language dealing 
with an attorney's liability for his clients' funds (which is also treated in Section 26-5). This 
subject is not covered in this note. 
5 Glenn v. Haynes, 192 Va. 574, 581 (1951); See also Staples Ex'ors v. Staples, 85 Va. 76 
(1888); For a jury instruction that "fairly states the obligation, duty and care that is owed 
by an attorney to his client," see Fowler v. Tobacco Growers, Inc., 195 Va. 770 (1954). 
6 217 Va. 88 (1976). 
7 Id., p. 90. 
s 214 Va. 144 (1973). 
9 Id., pp. 148-149. 
IO Id., p. 149. 
11 206 Va. 810 (1966). 
12 Lahy, "Perpetuities, Privity and Professional Liability," 2 U. Rich. Law Notes 203 (1966). 
13 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P. 2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). 
14 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), the precedent setting case thatled to the abolishing of 
lack of privity of contract as a defense in products liability cases. 
is Section 8.2-318, Va. Code Ann. (Add. vol. 1965). 
16 Section 55-22, Va. Code Ann. (Rep. vol. 1974). 
17 See "Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than His Immediate Client, for Consequences of 
Negligence in Carrying Out Legal Duties," Ann. 45 ALR 3rd 1181 (1972). 
is For those who wish to pursue these legal issues beyond this survey, The Defense Research 
Institute, Inc., 1100 West Wells Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233, has published an 
Annotated Bibliography, Liability of Attorneys (Vol. 1975 No. 2) that collects most of the 
periodical writing in this area. 
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